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Consider the predicament of a labor union whose members
have a legitimate dispute with their employer, but which has little
or no bargaining power because the traditional weapons have not
been effective. For example, a strike may have minimal impact if
the number of workers involved is so few that the company can
hire other workers to replace those on strike1 or can fill in with
management personnel; and picketing outside the employer's plant
may have little or no additional impact if other workers at the
plant, those who are not members of the union, choose not to
honor the picket line. The plant remains open, and the union's
traditional weapons have failed; and all the while the striking
workers are taking home no wages.
The union decides to turn to the public for help. One way it
can try to increase its pressure on the eimployer (e.g., a manufac-
turer or supplier) is to ask consumers not to buy the products
manufactured or supplied by the company (struck-products). The
union could go to the retail stores where the products are sold, and
attempt to persuade customers by setting up picket lines with
signs saying "PLEASE DON'T BUY PRODUCTS MADE BY
[COMPANY'S NAME]." Although the target of the union's pres-
sure tactic is the employer, it is obvious that if this tactic is suc-
cessful it would hurt not only the employer, but the retail store
owners as well since it would cut into their sales. And unless these
stores were owned, or otherwise "controlled,"2 by the manufacturer
or supplier, it is arguably unfair to involve these seemingly inde-
* National Labor Rel. Bd. v. Retail Store Employees Union Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607
(1980).
1. This employer reaction was legitimized in NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co.,
304 U.S. 333 (1938).
2. The concept of "control" has a specific legal meaning in this context, based on the
nature of the relationship between the retail store and the manufacturer. For a discussion of
the tests for determining control, see text accompanying note 29 infra.
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pendent stores in the dispute. Unfair or not, this tactic can be a
potent weapon against the employer, and a union might be in-
clined to use it. But here is the union's predicament: such picket-
ing may violate section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act (NLRA),s and it might not be protected by the First
Amendment.
In 1964 the Supreme Court held that such picketing did not
violate clause (ii) of section 8(b)(4) when the union's pressure was
carefully aimed only at the struck product, and not at the retail
store.4 The concomitant effect on the retailer was unavoidable, but
since the union was merely "following the struck product" from
the supplier to the retail outlet, there was no violation. But in 1980
the Supreme Court sharply limited the holding of its 1964 decision.
In NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001 (Retail
Store),5 the Court held that even where the union was merely fol-
lowing the struck-product the picketing was unlawful where the
struck product constituted a substantial part of the retail store's
business.' The Court reasoned that under those circumstances the
effect of the union's tactic was to put direct pressure on the retail
store as well as the supplier, and that constituted coercion of the
store owner in violation of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B).7
Although its reasoning on that point seems persuasive, its re-
sponse to the union's First Amendment defense was weak. Justice
Powell's plurality opinion on that issue was only one paragraph
long compared to the union's forty-six page argument.8 The con-
curring opinions by Justices Blackmun and Stevens were also un-
3. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) (1976). Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the NLRA reads:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents . . .
(4)(ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an
industry affecting commerce, where . . . an object thereof is . . . (B) forcing or
requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise
dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to
cease doing business with any other person, . . .: Provided, That nothing con-
tained in this clause (B) shall be construed to make unlawful, where not other-
wise unlawful, any primary strike or primary picketing.
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) (1976).
4. NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers and Warehousemen Local 760 ("Tree Fruits"),
337 U.S. 58 (1964).
5. 447 U.S. 607 (1980).
6. Id. at 614-15.
7. Id. at 615.
8. Brief for Defendant (Union) at 40-86, NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union Local
1001, 447 U.S. 607 (1980).
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satisfactory. This Note will explore the First Amendment discus-
sions by Powell, Blackmun and Stevens, and attempt to
demonstrate why their reasoning was inadequate.
B. Background
Clause (ii) of section 8(b)(4) and the relevant language of par-
agraph (B) were added to the NLRA in 1959.1 These changes were
designed to strengthen existing laws protecting independent busi-
nesses.10 The effect of these statutory changes, as originally inter-
preted by the National Labor Relations Board, was to make it per
se unlawful for a union to picket outside the independent retail
store,1" which was said to be "neutral"1 2 with respect to the labor
dispute. Although the primary object of such picketing would be
to dry up the demand for the wholesaler's product, an obvious sec-
ondary effect would be at least some injury to the neutral party's
business. Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) was enacted to protect the neutral
party from becoming a secondary casualty of the boycott.
For several years after the 1959 amendments, the Board's in-
terpretation of the new provision remained intact. All picketing
outside a neutral or "secondary" business (secondary business or
simply secondary) was prohibited, even though the tactic was in-
tended merely as a means of putting pressure on the "primary"
bdsiness (primary or employer13). The Board held that picketing,
when done outside a secondary business, always "constitutes re-
straint and coercion within the meaning of clause (ii)."14 This in-
terpetation lasted until 1964, when the Supreme Court decided
NLRB v. Fruit and Vegetable Packers and Warehouseman (Tree
Fruits).1 5 Concerned that a total ban on such picketing might vio-
9. They were among the changes made pursuant to the Labor-Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act, 73 Stat. 541 (1959) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 164 (1976)).
10. The changes were designed "to close certain so-called loopholes" in section 8(b)(4)
as it existed prior to 1959. United Wholesale and Warehouse Employees Local 261 [Perfec-
tion Mattress & Spring Company], 129 N.L.R.B. 1014, 1018 (1960). See text accompanying
note 38 infra.
11. United Wholesale and Warehouse Employees Local 261 [Perfection Mattress &
Spring Company], 129 N.L.R.B. 1014, 1023 (1960).
12. Id. at 1021.
13. Clearly, the secondary business may also be an employer, but this Note is concerned
with employees of the primary business, and hence the primary business is the "employer"
for purposes of this Note.
14. 129 N.L.R.B. at 1022.
15. 377 U.S. 58 (1964).
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late First Amendment guarantees,"' the Court held that whether
such picketing was unlawful under the new language would depend
upon what the pickets were asking the consumers to do.17 If they
were asking for a general boycott of the secondary's business
(called a secondary boycott's), then the picketing was unlawful.
But if they were merely asking the consumers to refrain from buy-
ing only those products manufactured by the primary (a struck-
product boycott19 ), then the picketing was not unlawful.2 0 Because
the Court found that the picketing in that case was designed to
induce only a struck-product boycott, the Court never reached the
constitutional question.
The Tree Fruits decision was reaffirmed, although narrowed
somewhat, in 1980. In NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union,
Local 1001 (Retail Store),2" the Supreme Court said that even
picketing to induce a struck-product boycott might sometimes be
unlawful. Since the Court found that the retailer's business relied
almost completely upon sales of struck products, the successful
struck-product boycott amounted to the same thing as a secondary
boycott. That, the Court held, was in violation of the 1959 lan-
222guage, 2 and hence it reinstated the Board's decision23 that the
16. Id. at 63.
17. Id. at 72.
18. Although the term "secondary boycott" is used in a variety of circumstances, it is
helpful to distinguish between those boycotts that are truly secondary boycotts, and those
which are directed at the primary business, but carried out at the location of the secondary
business. The secondary boycott is designed to put pressure on the owner of the secondary
business, in order to force him to cooperate with the union. The object might be to force the
owner to stop purchasing products from the wholesaler or manufacturer with which the
union has its dispute. In the secondary boycott the pressure is directed at the owner's busi-
ness. On the other hand, the primary boycott which is carried out at the location of the
secondary business is different, at least theoretically. Here, the pressure is directed not at
the owner of the secondary business, but at the wholesaler or manufacturer. Customers of
the secondary business are asked to avoid purchasing the particular product made by the
manufacturer or distributed by the wholesaler. Even though the customers are approached
as they enter the secondary business, they are free to shop there; they are merely asked to
avoid purchasing certain products.
For purposes of this Note, the latter kind of boycott will be referred to as a "struck-
products boycott," and the former will be referred to as a "secondary boycott."
19. For a more detailed explanation of the "struck-products boycott," see note 18
supra.
20. 377 U.S. at 71.
21. 447 U.S. 607 (1980).
22. Id. at 615.
23. Id. at 616 (reinstating the Board's decision, 226 N.L.R.B. 757-58).
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picketing was prohibited. Consequently, it had to address the
union's lengthy argument that the picketing was protected by the
First Amendment. Justice Powell's plurality answer was one para-
graph in length,24 and was described by Justice Blackmun in his
concurring opinion as a "cursory discussion [of the] difficult First
Amendment issues presented by this case." 25
While the result reached in Retail Store may be proper, 6 Jus-
tice Powell's plurality opinion on the First Amendment issue, and
each of the two concurring opinions, leave several questions unan-
swered. This Note will point out which questions were left unan-
swered, but to do so it is important first to examine the nature of
secondary boycotts in greater detail.
I. SECONDARY BOYCOTTS
The idea behind prohibiting a boycott of the secondary is to
protect its owner from pressures designed to draw him into a dis-
pute which is not his own. Since the statute prohibits forcing the
secondary to stop doing business with any "other" person, the
prohibitions apply only if the secondary is an entity "other" than
the primary. Thus, if the relationship between them is close, such
that the "secondary" may be deemed a part of the primary, the
prohibitions will not apply.28 Among the factors which the courts
have used to decide whether the would-be secondary and the pri-
mary are distinct entities are common ownership, the degree of
control that one has over the other, the extent of integration of the
business operations, the dependence of one employer on the other
for a substantial portion of its business, and whether there is an
interchange of employees between them.2 9
The secondary boycott prohibitions in the NLRA apply in two
24. Id.
25. 447 U.S. at 616 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
26. The author believes that this case should turn on whether or not the government
has a substantial interest in protecting the secondary, and feels that the government has not
clearly expressed such an interest. See text accompanying notes 155-57 infra. The author
offers no opinion on the wisdom of such an interest.
27. National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612 (1967), rehearing denied,
387 U.S. 926 (1967).
28. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 128 N.L.R.B. 916 (1960); General Team-
sters Local 324, Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 122 N.L.R.B. 25 (1958).




distinct contexts. In both, the pickets are trying to put pressure on
the secondary to persuade it to stop doing business with the pri-
mary, but the difference lies in the audience for which the picket
signs are intended. In one context, the signs are directed at other
unionized workers, generally those employed by the secondary.
The object is to induce them to engage in a sympathy strike or
other form of job action. In the other context, the signs are di-
rected at the shoppers who would patronize the secondary. In this
context, the union may, on one hand, intend a secondary boycott,
in which case the object is to get the shoppers not to buy anything.
On the other hand, the union may intend only a struck-products
boycott, in which case the object is merely to get them not to buy
certain products-the products made or supplied by the primary.
A great deal of pressure can be applied to a secondary when a
union induces or encourages the secondary's employees to engage
in a sympathy strike. By picketing at the location of the secondary,
the union "signals" to the secondary's employees its desire that
they stay off the job.30 While this activity may be said to fall into a
labor/labor picketing category (i.e., organized labor picketing to in-
duce a reaction from other members of organized labor), the
prohibitions of 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) have also been applied in the other
context mentioned-one which may be said to fall into a labor!
consumer picketing category (i.e., laborers picketing to induce a re-
action from consumers).31 Cases of the labor/labor variety usually
30. There are many examples of this in the construction industry, as where a union
pickets a general contractor to force it to stop dealing with a non-union subcontractor, In-
ternational Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694 (1951); NLRB v. In-
ternational Hod Carriers Local 1140, 285 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 903
(1961); NLRB v. Local 313, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 254 F.2d 221
(3d Cir. 1958); International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 501 v. NLRB, 181
F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1950), aff'd, 341 U.S. 694 (1951); or to force it to stop doing business with a
subcontractor whose workers are organized by a different union, United Brotherhood of
Carpenters & Joiners, 200 N.L.R.B. 1056 (1972). Examples are not limited to the construc-
tion industry. When union employees of a struck manufacturer picketed at the location of a
secondary, where trucks and freight cars loaded with goods manufactured by the primary
were sitting, with the result that union employees of the secondary refused to handle the
goods, a violation of the secondary boycott prohibitions was found. Chauffeurs, Teamsters &
Helpers Local 175 v. NLRB, 294 F.2d 261 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
31. United Steelworkers of America v. NLRB, 524 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1975), vacated,
429 U.S. 807 (1976); Kaynard v. Independent Routemen's Ass'n, 479 F.2d 1070 (2d Cir.
1973); Hoffman on behalf of NLRB v. Cement Masons Union Local 337, 468 F.2d 1187 (9th
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 986 (1973).
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arise under clause (i) of section 8(b)(4)(B).32 On the other hand,
the cases in which union picketing is directed at consumers (con-
sumer picketing cases3 3 ) will arise under clause (ii), which was
added to the NLRA in 1959 by the Labor-Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act (Landrum-Griffin).
II. FEDERAL REGULATION OF SECONDARY BOYCOTTS
A. The Taft-Hartley Loophole: The Landrum-Griffin Plug
The first of the secondary boycott provisions of the NLRA was
added in 1947 by the Labor Management Relations Act, more com-
monly known as the Taft-Hartley Act." It contained the forerun-
ner of what is now clause (i),"6 which, according to at least several
congressmen, was designed to outlaw secondary boycotts.3 7 But it
32. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(i)(B) (1976). Section 8(b)(4)(i)(B) of the NLRA reads:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents ...
(4)(i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by any
person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to engage in,
a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to use, manufacture, pro-
cess, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or
commodities or to perform any services ... [where] an object thereof is ... (B)
forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or
otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or manufac-
turer, or to cease doing business with any other person ....
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(i)(B) (1976). Clause (i) was added to the NLRA in 1947, under the
Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 61 Stat. 136, 141 (1947) (current version
at 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(i)(B) (1976)).
33. Although the expression might also suggest situations in which consumers are the
ones doing the picketing, the expression is used here to mean situations where union people
are doing the picketing, and consumers are the intended audience.
34. The Landrum-Griffin Act, § 704(a), 73 Stat. 542-43 (1958) (current version at 29
U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1976)).
35. 61 Stat. 136 (1947).
36. The relevant language added by the Taft-Hartley Act read:
8 (b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents
* ' * (4) to engage in, or to induce or encourage the employees of any employer to
engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment to
use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods,
articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services, where an object
thereof is: (A) forcing or requiring ... any employer or other person to cease
using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any
other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any
other person.
61 Stat. 136, 141 (1947).
37. See, e.g., remarks by Senator Goldwater, H N.L.R.B. Legislative History of the La-
bor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act 1079 (1959) [hereinafter cited as II Legis.
Hist.]: "When the Taft-Hartley Act was enacted in 1947, it was the intent of Congress to do
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left a loophole through which unions could continue to put pres-
sure on secondaries. Although a union was barred from inducing or
encouraging a secondary's employees to strike, there was nothing
in Taft-Hartley which prohibited the union from inducing the sec-
ondary's customers to boycott the store. Consequently, when Con-
gress was debating the amendments proposed in 1959, this loop-
hole was the subject of considerable attention. For example, in
remarks before the Senate on September 3, 1959, Senator Curtis
said: "[T]he overall objective has been to close the loopholes that
had developed in the secondary boycott protection afforded by the
Taft-Hartley Act. We all know that Congress intended to outlaw
secondary boycotts in 1947. For a variety of reasons the attempt
was not entirely successful." 8
Representative Griffin explained the loopholes as follows:
while the Taft-Hartley Act prohibited picketing at employee en-
trances to secondary businesses, it did not prohibit picketing at
consumer entrances.3" In an effort to plug the loophole, Represen-
tative Griffin co-authored a bill (the Landrum-Griffin bill) which
would make it unlawful for a union "to threaten, coerce or re-
strain" a secondary. This provision later appeared as clause (ii) of
section 8(b)(4).4 ' In his opinion, the language of clause (ii) would
solve the problem."1
When the Landrum-Griffin bill emerged from the House/Sen-
ate Conference Committee, clause (ii) remained intact. Further-
more, it appeared that Griffin's interpretation of that clause was
shared by others. On September 3, 1959, Senator Kennedy, who
chaired the Committee, reported to his colleagues the modifica-
tions which had been made to the bill.
Under the Landrum-Griffin bill it would have been impossible for a union to
away with secondary boycotts." See remarks by Senator Curtis, id. at 989.
38. II Legis. Hist. at 1441. More agitated remarks came from Senator McClellan on
April 24, 1959:
This is an intolerable situation, as all right thinking people have realized,
whatever their personal orientations. We thought that we had put an end to
secondary boycotts when we passed the Taft-Hartley Act and wrote into it sec-
tion 8(b)(4). But the ingenuity of the racketeering labor leaders has made a
shambles of section 8(b)(4). Through a variety of clever devices, virtually the
total effect of section 8(b)(4) has been avoided ....
II Legis. Hist. at 1196-97.
39. II Legis. Hist. at 1615 (remarks made during House debate, August 12, 1959).
40. See the language of clause (ii) cited in note 3 supra.
41. II Legis. Hist. at 1615.
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inform the customers of a secondary employer that that employer or store
was selling goods which were made under racket conditions or sweatshop con-
ditions, or in a plant where an economic strike was in progress. We were not
able to persuade the House conferees to permit picketing in front of that
secondary shop, but we were able to persuade them to agree that the union
shall be free to conduct informational activity short of picketing. In other
words, the union can hand out handbills at the shop, can place advertise-
ments in newspapers, can make announcements over the radio, and can carry
on all publicity short of having ambulatory picketing in front of a secondary
site."2
Thus, Senator Kennedy understood the bill to prohibit picketing
at a secondary site, and relayed that understanding to the full Sen-
ate. On the House side, Representative Thompson, who had served
with Kennedy on the Conference Committee, made a similar re-
port the following day.4 3 Shortly thereafter, the bill, containing
clause (ii), became law.
B. Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) Is Put to the Test: The Board
In December, 1960, the new clause was tested in a case before
the National Labor Relations Board." A union was picketing
outside consumer entrances to retail furniture stores which sold
products manufactured by the primary using non-union labor. The
picket signs asked the stores' customers not to buy those prod-
ucts. 45 To determine if this was a violation of clause (ii), the Board
examined the legislative history, noting especially the remarks by
Representative Griffin and Senator Kennedy.46 It came to the con-
clusion that such picketing constituted restraint and coercion
within the meaning of clause (ii), and therefore "consumer picket-
ing in front of a secondary establishment is prohibited. ' '47
42. Id. at 1432 (emphasis supplied).
43. Id. at 1720.
44. United Wholesale and Warehouse Employees Local 261, Retail, Wholesale and De-
partment Store Union, AFL-CIO [Perfection Mattress & Spring Company] and Samuel H.
Burr, 129 N.L.R.B. 1014 (1960). The case was also decided under 8(b)(4)(i)(B) since the
secondary's employees were "induced or encouraged" by the picketing to engage in a strike.
45. The signs read: "TO THE CONSUMING PUBLIC-PRODUCTS MADE BY
PERFECTION MATTRESS & SPRING COMPANY ARE MADE BY NON-UNION LA-
BOR, AS A CONSUMER, PLEASE DO NOT BUY THEM. Local 261, AFL-CIO" 129
N.L.R.B. at 1017.
46. See text accompanying notes 39 & 42 supra.
47. 129 N.L.R.B. at 1023. The Board also found a violation of clause (i), on the theory
that a picket line, even one aimed only at consumers, necessarily results in the inducement
or encouragement of a strike. The fact that the employees of the secondary did not actually
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In July of the following year, the Board dealt with another
consumer picketing case.4" Here again, the pickets were outside a
retail store, appealing to consumers. The union had been unable to
get local furniture stores to push sales of union-made and locally
produced furniture and mattresses, so the union picketed outside,
asking consumers to buy such products. Once again the Board
looked to the legislative history and said, in no uncertain terms,
the "[1]egislative history is clear that Congress by enacting clause
(ii) intended to outlaw customer or consumer picketing."49 The
Board then held that a request to buy particular products implied
a request to boycott others, and that was enough to constitute a
violation. The Board said: "The natural and foreseeable result of
the picketing, if successful, was to force or require the picketed
stores to reduce or cease altogether their dealings in the non-area
products, not made by the Respondent Union. This is an objective
proscribed by Section 8(b)(4)(B)." 50 Thus, whether the appeal to
consumers was successful was not material; it was the objective of
the appeal that mattered.5 1
In summary, the Board's position, as of 1961, was that con-
sumer picketing at a secondary location was always in violation of
clause (ii). That position was destined to be rejected.
C. Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) Is Put to the Test: The Court
Even as the Board was wrestling with these secondary con-
sumer boycott cases and formulating its position with respect to
clause (ii), the events which would lead to the reversal of that posi-
tion were taking place. A union, Fruit & Vegetable Packers &
Warehousemen, Local 760, represented workers employed by
twenty-one fresh fruit packing and warehousing firms in the
go on strike was not material. Id. at 1020.
48. Upholsterers Frame & Bedding Workers Twin City Local 61, affiliated with Uphol-
sterers' International Union of North America, AFL-CIO and Minneapolis House Furnish-
ing Company, 132 N.L.R.B. 40 (1961).
49. 132 N.L.R.B. 40, 44 n.9.
50. Id. at 44-45 (emphasis supplied).
51. The Board also examined the facts in light of clause (i) and found no violation. No
longer was the Board willing to say that the presence of a picket line necessarily constituted
inducement or encouragement within the meaning of clause (i). It would depend upon all
the evidence in the particular case. In this particular case, the Board found that the picket-
ing "was addressed to the consumer public alone" and did not amount to inducement or
encouragement of the secondary's employees. 132 N.L.R.B. at 42.
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Yakima, Washington area. The union negotiated on behalf of its
members with a corporation called Tree Fruits Labor Relations
Committee, Inc., which represented the twenty-one fruit packing
and warehousing firms. In 1960 the collective bargaining agreement
between them expired, and when the negotiations proved unsuc-
cessful the union called a strike in late August. The dispute wore
on for months, and in December the union decided to try a differ-
ent tactic: a consumer boycott of Washington State apples. Before
the end of the month, pickets appeared at several Safeway super-
markets in the Seattle. area.
52
In order not to interfere with Safeway employees, the pickets
arrived after the stores opened, left before they closed, and stayed
near consumer entrances only. There were never any more than
two or three pickets at a store at any one time. Doorways were
never blocked, and store operations remained normal at all times.5
The pickets had been given written instructions designed to ensure
that only the struck product, Washington State apples, would be
affected. They were told not to picket at employee or delivery en-
trances; not to interfere with employee work or deliveries; not to
make any statement suggesting that the retail store, itself, was un-
fair or on strike; and not to request that customers not patronize
the store. In addition, the store managers were each given a writ-
ten document explaining why the pickets were sent, and inviting
them to contact the union if there were any problems.5 Conse-
quently, when the Tree Fruits case went before the Board, 5 no
violation of clause (i) was found: neither Safeway employees nor
delivery persons had been induced or encouraged to engage in any
kind of action.
Clause (ii), however, was a different matter. The picket signs
had asked consumers not to buy Washington State apples.5
Safeway purchased these apples from the firms represented by the
Tree Fruits corporation. If the boycott were successful, Safeway
52. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen Local 760, 132 N.L.R.B. 1172, 1173-74
(1961).
53. Id. at 1177.
54. Id. at 1174-77.
55. 132 N.L.R.B. 1172 (1961).
56. The signs read: "TO THE CONSUMER: NON-UNION WASHINGTON STATE
APPLES ARE BEING SOLD AT THIS STORE. PLEASE DO NOT PURCHASE SUCH
APPLES. THANK YOU. TEAMSTERS LOCAL 760, YAKIMA WASHINGTON." The
pickets also passed out handbills of a similar message. 132 N.L.R.B. at 1175.
1981]
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would be forced to curtail or end those purchases, "and it is rea-
sonable to infer," said the Board, that the union "intended this
natural and foreseeable result. ' 57 A violation of 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) was
found, and the Board ordered the union to stop picketing outside
the Safeway stores.
The Court of Appeals, however, set aside the order, holding
that there could be no violation of 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) unless there was
proof that such picketing would "in fact" threaten, coerce, or re-
strain the secondary;58 i.e., that a substantial economic impact on
Safeway had occurred, or was likely to occur as a result of the pick-
eting. 9 Where the Board had found a violation based on the mere
fact of picketing at the location of the secondary, the Court of Ap-
peals instead looked to the actual result of the tactic. The case
went to the Supreme Court on certiorari.60 The Supreme Court did
not agree with the economic impact test of the Courts of Appeals."
Neither was it anxious to accept the Board's decision-that picket-
ing at the location of the secondary was an automatic viola-
tion-unless there was "the clearest indication" in the legislative
history that that was what Congress actually intended. 2 According
to the Court, the Board's conclusion would be valid only if Con-
gress had determined that all consumer picketing at a secondary
site always threatens, coerces or restrains the secondary business.6
Because of the Court's "concern that a broad ban against peaceful
picketing might collide with the guarantees of the First Amend-
ment,"" it felt a "special responsibility" to examine the legislative
history. After extensive examination, 5 the Court did not find the
"clearest indication" that Congress had made such a determina-
57. 132 N.L.R.B. at 1177-78.
58. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen Local 760, 308 F.2d 311, 315 (D.C. Cir.
1962). This holding was based on the language of the statute, legislative history notwith-
standing. But the court also relied on a statement by Representative Griffin in which he said
that primary picketing would not be prohibited if it was not intended to coerce the secon-
dary. Id. at 315-16 (quoting from II Legis. Hist. at 1615). The court cited this remark even
though Representative Griffin had made it in the context of primary picketing.
59. 308 F.2d at 318.
60. 374 U.S. 804 (1963).
61. NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen Local 760, 377 U.S. 58
(1964).
62. 377 U.S. at 63.
63. Id. at 62.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 62-70.
[Vol.'30
RETAIL STORE
tion, and held that the Board's conclusion was not valid.6
The proper conclusion, according to the Court, is one that dis-
tinguishes between picketing designed to hurt the secondary's bus-
iness generally (a secondary boycott-asking customers not to pa-
tronize the store) and picketing directed only at the primary (a
struck-product boycott-asking the secondary's customers not to
buy the primary's products). In the one, the union "creates a sepa-
rate dispute with the secondary," while in the other, the union is
merely "following the struck product" from the primary to the sec-
ondary site. In both, the secondary may wind up cutting back or
ceasing to do business with the primary; but in the former it would
be due to yielding under direct pressure, while in the latter it
would be due to a drop off in demand for the particular product.67
According to the Court, the statute prohibits picketing in the
former category, but picketing in the latter category is not prohib-
ited even though the secondary might wind up reducing or termi-
nating its business relationship with the primary. Although such
picketing might be prohibited under a literal reading of the stat-
ute, the Court felt that it would not be within the spirit of the
statute, "nor within the intention of its makers."6 8 Thus, the Court
found or created an exception to the otherwise unqualified ban on
picketing at a secondary location. It then found that the picketing
in the case fell into the latter category, and was therefore not pro-
hibited.69 Because it held for the union, the Court did not have to
address the union's First Amendment arguments.70
66. Id. at 71. The Court's holding has been criticized by various commentators. See,
e.g., Lewis, Consumer Picketing and the Court-The Questionable Yield of Tree Fruits, 49
MINN. L. REV. 479, 481 (1965); Comment, Product Picketing-A New Loophole in Section
8(b)(4) of the National Labor Relations Act?, 63 MICH. L. REV. 682, 686 (1965); Comment,
Consumer Picketing of Economically Interdependent Parties: Retail Store Employees Lo-
cal 1001 v. NLRB (Safeco Title Insurance Co.), 32 STAN. L. REv. 631, 636 (1980). However,
it has been defended by others. See, e.g., Note, Retail Store Employees Union Local 1001 v.
NLRB (Safeco Title Insurance Co.): Extending Tree Fruits to Protect Picketing of Pre-
dominant Product Secondaries, 74 Nw. U.L. REv. 970, 977-80 (1980).
67. 377 U.S. at 71-73.
68. Id. at 71-72. A concurring opinion by Justice Black, and a dissenting opinion by
Justice Harlan, in which he was joined by Justice Stewart, both felt that the majority had
misinterpreted the legislative history. Both agreed with the Board that Congress meant
clause (ii) to prohibit all consumer picketing at secondary sites. But while Harlan would
have outlawed picketing of this sort on the basis of clause (ii), Black would have held clause
(ii) to be unconstitutional on the basis of the First Amendment. See note 150 infra.
69. 377 U.S. at 71.
70. The union had argued that (1) picketing is "the workingman's means of communi-
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The Court also held that it did not matter whether the boy-
cott had or was likely to have a substantial economic impact on the
secondary-the Court of Appeals test was wrong. "A violation of
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) would not be established, merely because respon-
dents' picketing was effective to reduce Safeway's sales of Wash-
ington State apples, even if this led or might lead Safeway to drop
the item as a poor seller. 7 1 Nevertheless, sixteen years later, in
1980, the Court introduced a variation of-the Tree Fruits holding
reminiscent of the rejected economic impact approach. 2 While in
Tree Fruits the Court had held that a boycott limited to the struck
product was not prohibited by 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), in Retail Store,7 3 the
Court held that even a boycott limited to the struck product is
prohibited where a secondary's business deals almost exclusively
with the struck product.
In Retail Store the union had a dispute with the Safeco Title
Insurance Co. (Safeco),7 4 and went on strike. In addition to picket-
ing at Safeco's office in Seattle, the union also picketed outside the
five local title companies which sold Safeco's insurance to consum-
ers. The pickets identified Safeco as the object of their dispute,
and passed out handbills asking customers of these local compa-
nies to cancel their Safeco insurance policies which they had pur-
chased through the local companies. Thus, Safeco was the "pri-
mary" in this case, and the local companies were the
"secondaries."
But there was a critical difference between these secondaries
and the secondaries in the Tree Fruits case. With Safeway Super-
markets, the struck product-Washington State apples- consti-
tuted only one of many items sold, and only a small part of their
retail sales. With these local title companies, the struck product,
Safeco title insurance policies, was the only thing they sold, and
cation"; (2) the objective sought by the union was not unlawful; (3) the "signal" aspects of
picketing, on which previous cases enjoining picketing had turned, were absent here; and (4)
the consumers who were exposed to the picket signs in this case did not hold the same
loyalties as the persons who were exposed to picket signs in previous cases. Brief for Re-
spondent at 21-28, NLRB v. Fruit and Vegetable Packers, 377 U.S. 58 (1964).
71. Id. at 72-73. Indeed, it is worth noting that if the Union had been able to cut off the
supply of apples at the source, such that Safeway could not get them, the action would have
had an economic impact on Safeway.
72. NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607 (1980).
73. Id.
74. Contract negotiations between the Union and Safeco reached an impasse.
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such sales accounted for over 90% of the gross income of each. 5
On the basis of that difference, the NLRB distinguished this
case from Tree Fruits.6 The Board held that the picketing outside
the local title companies was prohibited by 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) even
though it was directed only at the struck product. Since the sale of
Safeco insurance policies accounted for almost all of the business
of the local title companies, the Board found that the picketing
was "reasonably calculated to induce customers not to patronize
the neutral parties at all."'77 In other words, the picketing was pro-
hibited because it amounted to the same thing as a call for a total
boycott of the secondary.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals rejected this distinction and
held that the picketing was not prohibited, citing Tree Fruits as
authority.78 The Supreme Court granted certiorari,7 9 and then
sided with the Board. 0
Although this was a significant narrowing of the Tree Fruits
holding, it was compatible with it in so far as both cases held that
Congress intended 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) to proscribe secondary picketing,
and both held that Congress did not intend it to proscribe picket-
ing limited to the struck product. But Retail Store went a step
further and held that if the struck product constitutes all or nearly
all of the secondary's business, then a boycott of that product
amounts to a boycott of the secondary, and is prohibited. 1
In holding that the picketing, under the particular facts of
that case, was prohibited by section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), the Retail Store
Court had to address what the Tree Fruits Court did not: the First
Amendment arguments raised by the union.82 Justice Powell's ma-
75. Retail Store Employees Union Local 1001, 226 N.L.R.B. 754, 755 (1976).
76. Id. at 757.
77. Id.
78. 627 F.2d 1133 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en banc).
79. 444 U.S. 1011 (1980). It is interesting to note that both the Board and the Court of
Appeals determined that the local title companies were far enough removed from the pri-
mary company, Safeco, to consider them "secondaries" in this case. This despite the fact
that their entire business consisted of selling Safeco insurance policies. These determina-
tions were not challenged before the Supreme Court, and thus were not discussed. For an
interesting discussion of this "neutrality" question, see Comment, Consumer Picketing of
Economically Interdependent Parties: Retail Store Employees Local 1001 v. NLRB (Safeco
Title Insurance Co.), 32 STAN. L. REv. 631 (1980).
80. NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607, 616 (1980).
81. Id. at 613.
82. See text & accompanying note 70 supra.
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jority opinion, which had been joined by five other Justices until
this point,83 became a plurality opinion on the First Amendment
question, as Justices Blackmun and Stevens did not join in that
portion. Each wrote a concurring opinion criticizing Powell's
analysis.8
Powell had indicated that picketing which was "calculated 'to
persuade the customers of the secondary employer to cease trading
with him'" was "in furtherance of [an] unlawful objective," and he
held that a prohibition of such picketing "did not offend the First
Amendment." 5 Blackmun considered this to be a "cursory discus-
sion" of "difficult First Amendment issues," and could not join it.80
After Blackmun, Stevens, referring to Powell's opinion, wrote
that a restriction on an "otherwise lawful expression of views" can
not be justified merely because it is proscribed by the statute.
"Otherwise the First Amendment would place no limit on Con-
gress' power. '8 7 However, Stevens held that picketing could be
proscribed because it is a mixture of conduct and communication,
and a restriction on the conduct portion was justified in this case.88
This rationale is derived from a line of cases beginning in 1942.
That line of cases is explored next.
III. A MIXTURE OF CONDUCT AND COMMUNICATION
The first of the modern labor picketing cases was Thornhill v.
Alabama in 1940.89 Thornhill was a union president, and had been
convicted under an Alabama statute which prohibited, among
other things, picketing outside a business for the purpose of inter-
fering with the business. The facts showed that there had been
only six to eight pickets posted at two locations, and there had
been no violence. At least one employee had been persuaded not to
cross the picket line.
On appeal, the Supreme Court found that the pickets were
83. Justices Berger, Stewart, Rehnquist, Blackmun and Stevens.
84. 447 U.S. at 616 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Id. at 618 (Stevens, J., concurring).
85. 447 U.S. at 616.
86. Id. For a discussion of Blackmun's answer to the First Amendment question, see
text and accompanying notes 148-57 infra.
87. 447 U.S. at 618.
88. Id. For a discussion of Stevens' argument, see text accompanying notes 130-36
infra.
89. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
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merely disseminating information concerning the facts of a labor
dispute-something which "must be regarded as within that area
of free discussion that is guaranteed by the Constitution.""0 Even
constitutionally protected speech can be prohibited where there is
a "clear and present danger,"9 1 but, said the Court, since the pick-
eting here caused only minor economic injury to the business
which had been picketed, the evil was not sufficient to justify in-
fringement of First Amendment rights.9 2 The conviction was re-
versed. Consequently, the Thornhill case protected picketing, but
only insofar as it was relatively ineffective against the picketed
concern.
Two years later the Court decided Bakery and Pastry Drivers
v. Wohl,9 3 which is a significant case not so much for its majority
opinion, but for a concurring opinion by Justice Douglas. The case
involved union truck drivers competing with non-union peddlars
who bought goods from bakeries and then sold them to retail out-
lets. The union sent pickets to several of the bakeries, but no more
than two pickets to any one location, and the picketing was always
peaceful. Nevertheless, the state court enjoined the picketing, ap-
parently on the theory that there was no legitimate labor dispute
between the union and the bakeries within the meaning of the
state statutes.
9 4
On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed on First Amend-
ment principles, applying the clear and present danger test, but
not mentioning the Thornhill case. The free speech rights of the
pickets could not be enjoined because the "substantive evil" (po-
tential economic harm to the bakeries) was not of sufficient magni-
tude to justify infringement.
95
In a concurring opinion Justice Douglas expressed dissatisfac-
tion with the majority's approach because it appeared to say that
picketing would only be protected as long as it was ineffective.96
90. Id. at 102.
91. The "clear and present danger" test protects expression unless such expression cre-
ates a clear and present danger of causing a substantive evil which the government has the
power to prohibit. The test was formulated by Justice Holmes. See Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
92. 310 U.S. at 105.
93. 315 U.S. 769 (1942).
94. Id. at 774.




He then quoted that part of Thornhill which had found that the
dissemination of information concerning the facts of a labor dis-
pute was protected free speech. But he noted that the Court, in
Thornhill, had recognized that picketing could be regulated under
certain limited circumstances: "Abridgement of the liberty of such
discussion can be justified only where the clear danger of substan-
tive evil arises under circumstances affording no opportunity to
test the merits of ideas by competition for acceptance in the mar-
ket of public opinion. '9 7 Picketing, he said, "might have a coercive
effect: *** Every expression of opinion on matters that are impor-
tant has the potentiality of inducing action in the interests of one
rather than another group in society."98 Then, in a single para-
graph, he made a statement which became the justification in a
line of subsequent cases for upholding prohibitions of picketing.
Picketing by an organized group is more than free speech, since it involves
patrol of a particular locality and since the very presence of a picket line may
induce action of one kind or another, quite irrespective of the nature of the
ideas which are being disseminated. Hence those aspects of picketing make it
the subject of restrictive regulation.99
Seven years after Bakery Drivers the Court decided Giboney
v. Empire Storage and Ice Company,100 a case involving union and
non-union peddlars who purchased ice from the Empire company,
and sold it at retail. The union tried to persuade the company to
discontinue doing business with non-union peddlars, but the com-
pany refused because to do so would have been a violation of the
state's antitrust laws. When the union picketed the plant, most of
the truck drivers working for the company's customers refused to
cross the picket line, because to do so would have meant subjecting
themselves to fines or suspension by the unions to which they be-
longed. This had a devastating impact on the company. Conse-
quently, the company sought, and the state court granted, an in-
junction against further picketing. On appeal, the U.S. Supreme
Court affirmed.10 1
The union argued that the picketing was protected free
speech, but the Court disagreed. Picketing by itself may be pro-
97. Id. at 776 (quoting Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 104-05).
98. Id. at 776.
99. Id. at 776-77.





the record here does not permit this publicizing to be treated in isolation....
[A]lI of the [union's] activities-their 'powerful transportation combination,
their patrolling, their formation of a picket line warning union men not to
cross at peril of their union membership, their publicizing-constituted a sin-
gle and integrated course of conduct, which was in violation of Missouri's
valid law.102
The Court held the picketing to be part of a "course of conduct,"
and made two separate references to Douglas' "more than speech"
paragraph.103 On that basis, the Court held that the picketing in
this case was not protected, and could be enjoined. 104
The Giboney case is significant for three reasons: First, it in-
corporated Douglas' "more than speech" remark into a majority
opinion, thereby legitimizing it for those who might not otherwise
rely on it. Second, it held that picketing could be enjoined when it
is part of an integrated "course of conduct" which is in violation of
a valid law. And third, it pointed out the special reaction that
picketing can evoke in the labor/labor context.105 Referring to the
union truck drivers who refused to cross the picket line, the Court
said: "Had any one of them crossed the picket line he would have
been subject to fine or suspension by the union of which he was a
member."'' 06 This remark illustrates what Justice Douglas was say-
ing in Bakery Drivers.0 7 It is an illustration of, to use Douglas'
words, the kind of "action induced" by "the very presence of a
picket line," action "quite irrespective of the nature of the ideas
which [were] being disseminated." ' The truck drivers who re-
fused to cross the line did so not necessarily because of what the
signs said, but perhaps because of the special reaction that they
had on account of their union obligations and loyalties.
The following year the Court decided a case in which consum-
102. Id. at 498 (emphasis supplied).
103. The first reference appeared at 336 U.S. at 501: "A concurring opinion in the Wohl
Case, at pp. 776, 777, pointed out that picketing may include conduct other than speech
.... " The other reference appeared at 336 U.S. at 503: "And it is clear that appellants
were doing more than exercising a right of free speech or press. Bakery & Pastry Drivers v.
Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 776, 777." This latter reference included a footnote which quoted Doug-
las' "more than speech" paragraph.
104. 336 U.S. at 504.
105. See text accompanying note 127 infra.
106. 336 U.S. at 493.
107. Bakery & Pastry Drivers v. Woh, 315 U.S. 769 (1942).
108. See text accompanying note 99 supra.
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ers picketed outside a retail store, in an effort to persuade other
consumers to boycott the store. In Hughes v. Superior Court of
California0 9 a grocery store was picketed by blacks because the
store refused to agree to hire black store clerks as white clerks
quit. They wanted the ratio of black clerks to white clerks to ap-
proximate the ratio of black customers to white customers. The
injunction obtained by the grocery store was upheld by the state's
Supreme Court on the theory that the purpose of the picketing-to
induce "arbitrary discrimination upon the basis of race and color
alone, rather than a choice based solely upon individual qualifica-
tion for the work to be done"-was unlawful.11 That decision was
affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court.1
In response to First Amendment arguments, Justice Frank-
furter held that although states may not encroach upon the right
of free expression, picketing is "something more and different.
'11 2
He quoted and relied on Douglas' "more than speech" paragraph,
and also cited Giboney.113 But unlike the situation in Giboney,
where the picket signs were directed at union truck drivers, in
Hughes, the picket signs were directed at consumers. Justice
Frankfurter did not address that distinction, and in view of the
language used in Giboney, perhaps he should have. The Giboney
Court referred to the union truck drivers as "allies" of the pick-
ets.114 This suggests that there was a special loyalty between the
two. Were the consumers in Hughes also to be considered "allies"
of the pickets? Did Justice Frankfurter feel that the same factors,
or ones similar to those, that came into play when a union truck
driver was confronted with a picket line would also come into play
when a consumer was confronted with a picket line? Certainly the
consumers could not be fined for crossing the picket line, but it is
quite possible, although he did not say so, that Justice Frankfurter
believed that the black c6nsumers might have had a special reac-
tion to the sight of black pickets not dissimilar to the special reac-
tion the union truck drivers had to the sight of fellow union men
picketing in Giboney. If that is to be inferred from a reading of the
109. 339 U.S. 460 (1950).
110. Hughes v. Superior Court, 32 Cal.2d 850, 856, 198 P.2d 885, 890 (1948).
111. 339 U.S. 460 (1950).
112. Id. at 464.
113. Id. at 466.
114. 336 U.S. at 503.
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Hughes opinion, it is an important point to keep in mind for fu-
ture cases involving consumers. If it is not to be inferred from the
opinion, then perhaps Justice Frankfurter should have addressed
the distinction between the kind of reaction a union "ally"' has
when he sees a picket line, and the kind a consumer has.
Another significant picketing case was decided in 1957. In In-
ternational Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Vogt 115 the union tried to
organize the employees of a gravel-pit business, but without suc-
cess. So they picketed the business, and as a result the drivers of
several trucking companies refused to cross the picket lines and
the company suffered substantial economic damage. The state
court granted an injunction against further picketing, and the U.S.
Supreme Court affirmed.
Justice Frankfurter wrote for the, majority, and stated that
even peaceful picketing involved more than just communication
(quoting Douglas' "more than speech" paragraph) . 16 and was
therefore subject to state regulation if it was in furtherance of an
objective that was against public policy. He cited Giboney as the
"decisive reconsideration"117 of the Thornhill doctrine.
With Vogt, the Thornhill doctrine was essentially "reconsid-
ered" out of the picture.1 " Indeed, Justice Douglas in a dissenting
opinion in Vogt declared that with the majority's holding, "[tihe
Court has now come full circle" since Thornhil.119 Douglas, the
author of the "more than speech" paragraph 15 years earlier, was
unhappy with where it had led. "[W]here . . . there is no rioting,
no mass picketing, no violence, no disorder, no fisticuffs, no coer-
cion-indeed nothing but speech-the principles announced in
Thornhill... should give the advocacy of one side of a dispute
First Amendment protection .... Today, the Court signs the for-
mal surrender." 120
115. 354 U.S. 284 (1957).
116. Id. at 289.
117. Id. at 291.
118. See L. TRIE, AmERicAN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 598 n.3 (1978). "The result of the
cases after Thornhill upholding state bans on peaceful picketing directed at ends the state
has properly forbidden is that the states are essentially as free to regulate labor picketing
today as if Thornhill had not been decided."
119. 354 U.S. at 295.
120. Id. at 296-97.
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IV. A MIXTURE OF CONDUCT AND COMMUNICATION: SOME
UNANSWERED QUESTIONS
In his "more than speech" paragraph in Bakery Drivers, Jus-
tice Douglas had given two reasons why he felt that picketing is
more than speech. First, "it involves patrol of a particular local-
ity," and second, "the very presence of a picket line may induce
action . . . quite irrespective of the nature of the ideas which are
being disseminated.
'121
Although it is certainly true that picketing involves "patrol-
ling," it seems important to ask what it is about the patrolling as-
pect of picketing that distinguishes picketing from other forms of
communication which involve conduct but which are pro-
tected-such as handing out leaflets, for example? 122 Certainly
there is a physical difference between walking back and forth in a
given location while carrying a sign, and distributing leaflets at the
same location. But the question is: is the difference meaningful in
terms of protected speech?1 23 And does a person handing out leaf-
lets lose his protected status if he starts walking around as he dis-
tributes his leaflets?
It seems doubtful that the walking back and forth aspect of
picketing is what prompted Justice Douglas to say that picketing is
more than speech. Such a conclusion would suggest that the same
picket holding the same sign in front of the same store would not
be exceeding the bounds of free speech if he remained stationary.
It is doubtful that that was what Douglas meant to suggest when
he said that the "patrolling" aspect of picketing makes it the sub-
ject of restrictive regulation.
On the other hand, it might be argued that the message com-
121. Bakery & Pastry Drivers & Helpers Local v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 775 (1942) (Doug-
las, J., concurring).
122. The Court has held that handbilling or leafleting is protected speech. See Organi-
zation for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214
(1966); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
123. Professor Tribe has argued that the Supreme Court has never articulated a basis
for its distinction between speech and conduct, and that it could not do so because "expres-
sion and conduct, message and medium, are... inextricably tied together in all communi-
cative behavior... ." L. TRNE, AMERicAN CONSTITUTIoNAL LAW 599 (1978). Consequently, he
says, "any particular course of conduct may be hung almost randomly on the 'speech' peg or
the 'conduct' peg as one sees fit." Id. at 600. If Professor Tribe is correct, then it is doubtful
that there is any meaningful difference between the conduct involved in picketing, and that
involved in leafleting or any other communicative behavior.
[Vol. 30
RETAIL STORE
municated when several pickets walk back and forth in a given lo-
cation is different than the words on the signs; that people do not
read the signs, but instead automatically perceive a subjective mes-
sage-"quite irrespective of the nature of the ideas which are being
disseminated"-as a result of seeing the activity which is taking
place. This is the thrust of Douglas' second reason. But this argu-
ment seems unfair. It assumes that many or most people will react
to the sight of a picket line in some automatic, subjective way; that
few people will bother to read the signs and analyze the informa-
tion communicated. This is a major assumption to make without
statistically sound evidence. Yet, as will be discussed infra,24 the
Court has made this assumption in Giboney and subsequent cases.
Furthermore, it assumes that any automatic, subjective message
based on the sight of a picket line is not a valid message, worthy of
protection. Keeping in mind that different people observing the
same picket line may perceive different subjective-type messages
depending upon their particular psyche, is that a valid assump-
tion? In view of the First Amendment, this kind of assumption de-
mands very strict scrutiny.
However, it might be argued that "patrolling," at least in a
labor dispute, is somehow more intimidating than leafleting. But
whether picketing has an intimidating or coercive effect on con-
sumers seems a question of fact, to be decided on a case by case
basis. For example, 1621, Inc. v. Wilson,12 5 was a consumer picket-
ing case before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Justice Cohen,
after noting that the record was devoid of evidence of express or
implied threats between the pickets and the consumers, "which
might indicate intimidation or coercion, either physical or psycho-
logical," said: "Completely absent are those non-speech elements
of picketing which have, in prior cases, been the basis and justifica-
tion for state interference.... We have, thus, nothing more than
an attempt at persuasion, an appeal not to patronize this liquor
establishment." '126 At the very least, it is arguable that the degree
of intimidation, if any, will vary depending upon such factors as
the number of pickets at a given location, the age of the pickets,
their sex, and style of dress.
124. See text accompanying notes 127-32 infra.
125. 402 Pa. 94, 166 A.2d 271 (1961).
126. Id. at 102, 166 A.2d at 275.
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Yet, there are other reactions, apart from intimidation, that
observers might have to the sight of a picket line. A good illustra-
tion of this occurred in the Giboney case.1 27 There, union truck
drivers refused to cross a picket line set up by striking union work-
ers. The Court observed that the drivers would have been fined or
suspended from their respective unions had they crossed the line.
Thus, for these union drivers, the picket line had a special meaning
quite irrespective of the nature of the message on the picket signs.
But even if it is proper in such a situation to hold that the picket-
ing should lose its First Amendment protection for that reason,
can it be assumed that the same holds true in the consumer con-
text? In other words, can it be assumed that a consumer's reaction
to a picket line will also be a reaction quite irrespective of the na-
ture of the message on the picket signs?
Consider the remarks of Circuit Judge Bazelon in the Court of
Appeals opinion in the Tree Fruits case. 2 " After quoting Douglas'
"more than speech" paragraph, he said:
The response to which Mr. Justice Douglas referred is characteristic of union-
ized employees to whom pickets have traditionally addressed their appeal.
Such employees are subject to group discipline based on common interests
and loyalities, habit, fear of social ostracism, or the application of severe eco-
nomic sanctions. Hence, they may refuse to work or to make pickups and
deliveries for a secondary employer, thereby causing him serious and immedi-
ate economic injury. . . . In that context, picketing is more than "pure"
speech.
In this case, however, the Union sought to enlist the support of members
of the public at large and successfully sought to prevent its picketing from
having the customary "signal" effect on employees. Each prospective patron
could read the Union's signs and literature and determine, in the light of his
own interests and convictions, what course he would follow.... Thus it may
well be that the picketing in this case is closer to the core notion of the con-
stitutionally protected free speech than the picketing the Supreme Court has
held may be banned.129
The Supreme Court cases of picketing to which Judge Bazelon was
referring were Giboney and Vogt. If a reaction "quite irrespective
of the nature of the ideas which are being disseminated" is what
justifies removing picketing from the realm of protected speech, do
127. Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1948). See text accompanying
notes 100-08 supra.
128. Fruit and Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen Local 760 v. NLRB, 308 F.2d 311
(1962).
129. Id. at 316.
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we not have a constitutional obligation to be sure that consumers
have this sort of reaction before we consider removing consumer
picketing from the realm of protected speech?
In Retail Store, Justice Stevens held that the Union's First
Amendment argument could be disposed of because "picketing is a
mixture of conduct and communication," and section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)
only affects "that aspect of the union's efforts to communicate its
views that calls for an automatic response to a signal, rather than a
reasoned response to an idea."130 He quoted Douglas' "more than
speech" paragraph, but he pointed to no evidence to demonstrate
that the consumers had an automatic response to a signal. In fact,
he did not respond to the union's argument that
there is no basis whatsoever for the assumption that one or two individuals
peacefully carrying placards addressed to consumers without blocking their
entrance to a store evoke a loyalty or response which is not due to the verbal
message of the placard.... Plainly, neither the Board's General Counsel nor
Safeco presented any evidence that any of the prospective customers of the
picketed land title companies were intimidated or overreached by the picket
signs.
131
The only support he offered for this idea was an assertion that
handbills containing the same message are much less effective than
picketing because they depend entirely on the persuasive force of
the idea. But he offered no support for this assertion,3 2 and even if
it is true, it may be because the carrying of large signs bearing
short phrases is more of an attention-grabber than the passing out
of small handbills which often contain a more detailed presenta-
tion of the opinion. In fact, a consumer might be more annoyed at
having a handbill thrust at him, since he must then find a trash
basket to dispose of it.
In short, Justice Stevens' argument may indeed be valid, but
before it is used to infringe on what might otherwise be constitu-
tionally protected speech, it would seem that some evidence for his
points should be offered.
Parenthetically, it is worthy of note that although Stevens
quoted the "more than speech" paragraph from Bakery Drivers, he
130. 447 U.S. at 619 (Stevens, J., concurring).
131. Brief for Defendant (Union) at 65, NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union Local
1001, 447 U.S. 607 (1980).
132. There is support for the opposite point of view. See Lovell v. Griffi, 303 U.S. 444
(1938) (leafleting is a most effective instrument in the dissemination of opinion).
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did not follow through on the rest of Douglas' argument in that
case. Douglas had gone on to say that the state law at issue in that
case should be held unconstitutional because it was "not a regula-
tion of picketing per se-narrowly drawn, of general application,
and regulating the use of the streets by all picketeers [sic]." 33 The
same argument can be made about 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). It does not pro-
hibit picketing per se, since it only prohibits that picketing which
would threaten, coerce or restrain the secondary.' 3' It does not reg-
ulate the use of the streets by all pickets, since picketing for any
other reason on the public street is not prohibited under that sec-
tion.13 5 Stevens did not address this matter, although Justice
Blackmun did.13
V. A FEW MORE UNANSWERED QUESTIONS
The First Amendment portion of Justice Powell's opinion in
Retail Store, which was one paragraph in length, contained essen-
tially two points: (1) that Congress had the power to outlaw picket-
ing to induce a secondary boycott, and (2) that a prohibition of
picketing in furtherance of "such unlawful objectives" did not of-
fend the First Amendment.
3 7
The first of these points was attributed to Tree Fruits.33 Pow-
ell said, "the [Tree Fruits] Court left no doubt that Congress may
prohibit" picketing to induce a secondary boycott.'3 9 But it is not
clear how Tree Fruits supports that statement since it never
reached the constitutional issue, and thus never addressed the
question of congressional power. The Tree Fruits Court did say
that its reading of the legislative history revealed that Congress
believed it was necessary to prohibit secondary boycotts;" 0 that a
secondary boycott was "poles apart" from a struck-product boy-
133. 315 U.S. at 777 (Douglas, J., concurring).
134. See text accompanying note 3 supra.
135. See NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, 377 U.S. 58, 79 (Black, J., concurring).
"All who do not patrol to publicize this kind of dispute are, so far as this section of the
statute is concerned, left wholly free to patrol." Id.
136. See note 150 infra.
137. 447 U.S. at 616.
138. NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers and Warehousemen Local 760, 377 U.S. 58
(1964).
139. 447 U.S. at 616 (emphasis supplied).
140. 377 U.S. at 63.
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cott;141 that secondary boycotts were meant to be prohibited;142
and that a secondary boycott "does more than merely follow the
struck product; it creates a separate dispute with the secondary
employer. 1 43 That was all that was said on the subject of sec-
ondary boycotts. The question of congressional power was not even
reached, let alone resolved to the point of leaving no doubt.
On Powell's second point-his decision on the First Amend-
ment issue-he held that a prohibition on picketing does not of-
fend the First Amendment if the picketing is in furtherance of an
unlawful objective.144 He cited International Brotherhood of Elec-
trical Workers, Local 501 v. N.L.R.B., 45 but did not discuss it. In
that case, the Court refused to find section 8(b)(4) unconstitu-
tional, saying only that "[t]he substantive evil condemned by Con-
gress in § 8(b)(4) is the secondary boycott and we recently have
recognized the constitutional right of states to proscribe picketing
in furtherance of comparably unlawful objectives. There is no rea-
son why Congress may not do likewise. 1 1 46 In essence the Court
had held that Congress may pass a law prohibiting picketing which
is designed to induce a secondary boycott because secondary boy-
cotts are illegal. But on that theory, Congress can easily skirt the
First Amendment by declaring any objective to be unlawful. This
was the reason Justice Stevens declined to join the First Amend-
ment portion of Powell's opinion. Stevens argued: "That a statute
proscribes the otherwise lawful expression of views in a particular
manner and at a particular location cannot in itself totally justify
the restriction. Otherwise the First Amendment would place no
limit on Congress' power. 1 47 Justice Stevens' objection to Powell's
position applies equally well to the Electrical Workers case.
Justice Blackmun was also unwilling to join the First Amend-
ment portion of Powell's opinion, referring to it as a "cursory dis-
141. Id. at 70.
142. Id. at 71.
143. Id. at 72.
144. 447 U.S. at 616.
145. 341 U.S. 694 (1950). This case involved a union's agent who, by peaceful picketing,
induced employees of a subcontractor on a construction project to engage in a strike in the
course of their employment, where an object of such inducement was to force the general
contractor to terminate its contract with another subcontractor. The Court found that to be
a violation of 8(b)(4)(A).
146. 341 U.S. at 705 (footnote omitted).
147. 447 U.S. at 618 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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cussion" of "difficult First Amendment issues." 8 Initially, he said
that Powell had failed to take into account the Court's decision in
Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley."4 That case held invalid
a Chicago ordinance which prohibited all picketing near public
schools except labor picketing. The Court held that the ordinance
unconstitutionally discriminated on the basis of the sign's content.
Blackmun felt that section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) also discriminated on the
basis of content, and Powell's decision did not square with Mos-
ley. 50 But because Blackmun was not "fully comfortable" with the
Mosley decision,15' the fact that Powell had not taken it into ac-
count was only a technical problem.'52
For Blackmun, the constitutionality of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)
turned on a "substantial governmental interests" theory. 5 3 He felt
that the union had a strong First Amendment argument, but he
also felt that the government had a substantial interest in protect-
148. Id. at 616 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
149. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
150. To illustrate that point, Blackmun quoted from Justice Black's concurring opinion
in Tree Fruits, 377 U.S. at 76. There, Black had argued that section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) was un-
constitutional because it discriminated on the basis of content. His reasoning was similar to
the Court's reasoning in Mosley, which was decided eight years after Tree Fruits. Black
believed that picketing in any context included an element of conduct vulnerable to govern-
ment control (citing Douglas' "more than speech" paragraph), but he argued that the sec-
tion was not passed for the purpose of controlling the conduct element since there was no
general prohibition of all picketing in that setting:
[Tihe statute in no way manifests any government interest against patrolling as
such, since the only patrolling it seeks to make unlawful is that which is carried
on to advise the public, including consumers, that certain products have been
produced by an employer with whom the picketers have a dispute. All who do
not patrol to publicize this kind of dispute are, so far as this section of the stat-
ute is concerned, left wholly free to patrol.
377 U.S. at 78-79. Therefore, concluded Black, "the section is aimed at outlawing free dis-
cussion of one side of a certain kind of labor dispute." Id. at 79.
151. 447 U.S. at 617. Said Blackmun, "I have never been fully comfortable with Mos-
ley's equating all content selectivity in affording access to picketers with censorship." Id.
152. Blackmun had not joined the majority opinion in Mosley; he concurred without
opinion. 408 U.S. at 102.
153. Blackmun said that he was deciding against the union
only because I am reluctant to hold unconstitutional Congress' striking of the
delicate balance between union freedom of expression, and the ability of neutral
employers, employees, and consumers to remain free from coerced participation
in industrial strife. My vote should not be read as foreclosing an opposite con-
clusion where another statutory ban on peaceful picketing, unsupported by
equally substantial government interests, is at issue.
447 U.S. at 618 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
RETAIL STORE
ing neutrals.154 Consequently, he decided against the union because
he was "reluctant" to disturb Congress' scheme for a "delicate bal-
ance" between the two interests.
But there are several problems with Blackmun's analysis. For
one thing, it is difficult to understand how the government could
have a substantial interest in protecting secondaries, when section
8(b), itself, allows the union to do by other methods what it may
not do by picketing:
[N]othing contained in [section 8(b)(4)] shall be construed to prohibit public-
ity, other than picketing, for the purpose of truthfully advising the public,
including consumers ... , that a product or products are produced by an
employer with whom the labor organization has a primary dispute and are
distributed by [a secondary] .... 25
This language would allow the union to hand out leaflets, or other-
wise publicize its dispute, at the location of the secondary. It would
allow the union to attempt to induce a struck-products boy-
cott-even if, as in Retail Store, the secondary's business were
overwhelmingly dependent upon sales of the primary's product.
It may be true, as Stevens said,156 that picketing is more effec-
tive than other forms of communication, but nevertheless Congress
chose to permit all other forms. Clearly, then, Congress intended to
permit the union to try and achieve its goal by other means. Con-
sequently, it is difficult to see how the government could have a
substantial interest in protecting the secondary by merely remov-
ing one of the ways the union could achieve its goal.
Furthermore, even if the section does serve to protect second-
aries, it protects them only in cases where the union is fairly weak.
Where the union is strong enough to shut down the employer's
plant, or otherwise reduce the employer's output by merely going
on strike, the secondaries will suffer economic harm-despite the
protection of 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)-because the supply of the employer's
products is reduced or halted. 57 Thus, if the government has a
154. Blackmun properly assumed that the secondaries in the case were neutral. This is
because the question of neutrality was not before the Court, having been resolved by the
National Labor Relations Board, and affirmed on appeal by the circuit court. The union did
not appeal on that issue. See note 79 supra.
155. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1976).
156. 447 U.S. at 619 (Stevens, J., concurring).
157. See the dissenting opinion in Retail Store, wherein Justice Brennan notes that
"inasmuch as the secondary retailer is, by definition, at least partially dependent upon the
sale of the primary employer's goods, the secondary firm will necessarily feel the pressure of
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substantial interest in protecting secondaries, it failed to achieve
its goal except in the case of weaker unions.
Finally, even if section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) does protect the sec-
ondary, it also does more than that; it puts the union at a disad-
vantage in its dispute with the primary. If the union is unable to
induce an effective struck-products boycott, the secondary will
continue to sell those products, and the primary will probably ben-
efit from those sales. In an effort to protect the secondary, Con-
gress has aided the primary.
Blackmun appears to have decided that congressional passage
of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) indicates that the government has a sub-
stantial interest in protecting neutrals. This approach seems only a
variation on Powell's: if Congress passes a law protecting second-
aries, a prohibition on picketing which would hurt the secondaries
does not offend the First Amendment. For the reasons articulated
by Stevens, this approach does not make sense.
CONCLUSION
The Retail Store Court missed an opportunity to reexamine
the law with respect to picketing directed not at other union work-
ers, but at consumers. Even if picketing in the labor/labor context
causes its audience to experience an automatic response to a signal,
it is not clear that the general public experiences a similar reaction
to the sight of a picket line. And even if it is assumed that picket-
ing aimed at the general public might cause an automatic response,
it seems safe to say that the responses will vary from one person to
the next, from one location to the next, and from one time to the
next. And certainly the responses will vary depending upon how
many pickets are on the picket line, how old they are, and what
they look like. In short, it should not be assumed that picketing in
the consumer context is more than speech, justifying an infringe-
ment upon the pickets' First Amendment rights. At best, the facts
of each situation should be explored, and decisions made on a case-
by-case basis.
Although Justice Blackmun said that this case .presented
labor activity pointed at the primary enterprise." 447 U.S. at 620 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The dissenting opinion, written by Justice Brennan and joined by White and Marshall, did
not discuss the First Amendment issue, but instead attacked the majority's emphasis on
how much of the secondary's business was dependent upon sales of the primary's product.
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"what for me are difficult First Amendment issues,' 58 he felt that
the government had an interest in protecting secondaries, substan-
tial enough to justify overriding those First Amendment issues. He
felt that Congress had struck a delicate balance between compet-
ing interests which he was reluctant to disturb. Yet it is not clear
that Congress had as substantial an interest as he suggests. Con-
gress permits unions to distribute leaflets, or otherwise publicize
their dispute, asking consumers to boycott the primary's products.
Successful efforts will hurt the secondary, yet Congress permits it.
Furthermore, secondaries are hurt whenever a union is successful
in other actions against the employer. If a strike shuts down the
employer's plant, the secondaries are hurt. Nevertheless, Congress
has not prohibited legitimate pressure tactics against an employer.
This is not to suggest that picketing in the consumer context
should never be regulated. But where precious constitutional free-
doms are at stake, courts must be certain that the justification for
doing so is truly substantial.
EDWARD N. ROGALIN
158. 447 U.S. at 616 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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